

Question 1 *A Tour of Tor*

As a reminder, when connecting to a normal website through Tor, your computer first queries the Tor “consensus” to get a list of all Tor nodes, and using this information it connects to the first Tor node and, from there, creates a circuit through the Tor network, eventually ending at an exit node.

Q1.1 (4 min) Consider the scenario where you are in a censored country and the censor chooses not to block Tor, the censor is the adversary, and no Tor relays exist within this country. How many Tor relays must your traffic pass through, including the exit node, to prevent the censor from blocking your traffic.

- One
- Two
- Three
- Four
- Tor doesn't stop this adversary

Q1.2 (4 min) Consider the scenario where you are the only user of Tor on a network that keeps detailed logs of all IPs contacted. You use Tor to email a threat. The network operator is made aware of this threat and that it was sent through Tor and probably originated on the operator's network. How many Tor relays must your traffic pass through, including the exit node, to guarantee the network operator can't identify you as the one who sent the threat?

- One
- Two
- Three
- Four
- Tor doesn't stop this adversary

Q1.3 (4 min) Consider the scenario where there is a single hostile Tor node but you don't know that node's identity, and that node can be an exit node. You want to keep confidential from this node what HTTP sites you are visiting through Tor. How many Tor relays must your traffic pass through, including the exit node, to guarantee this adversary can't know what sites you visit?

- One
- Two
- Three
- Four
- Tor doesn't stop this adversary

Q1.4 (4 min) Consider the scenario where there are multiple independent hostile Tor nodes but you don't know their identities, and these nodes can be exit nodes. You want to keep confidential from all these nodes what HTTP sites you are visiting through Tor. How many Tor relays must your traffic pass through, including the exit node, to guarantee that every independent hostile node can't know what sites you visit?

- One
- Two
- Three
- Four
- Tor doesn't stop this adversary

Q1.5 (4 min) Consider the scenario where there are multiple colluding hostile Tor nodes but you don't know those nodes identities, and these nodes can be exit nodes. You want to keep confidential from all these nodes what HTTP sites you are visiting through Tor. How many Tor relays must your traffic pass through, including the exit node, to guarantee that the colluding system of hostile nodes can't know what sites you visit?

- One
- Two
- Three
- Four
- Tor doesn't stop this adversary

Q1.6 (4 min) Consider the scenario where there is a single hostile Tor node but you don't know that node's identity, and that node can be an exit node. You want to have data integrity for the HTTP sites you are visiting through Tor. How many Tor relays must your traffic pass through, including the exit node, to guarantee this adversary can't manipulate the data you receive from the sites you visit?

- One
- Two
- Three
- Four
- Tor doesn't stop this adversary

Question 2 *Suit of Armor Around the World*

You are tasked with securing The Avengers' internal network against potentially malicious protocols! For each type of firewall and set of traffic, state whether the firewall is able to achieve the desired functionality with perfect accuracy. **Assume that IP packets are never fragmented.** All connections that are not mentioned can be either allowed or denied.

If you answer Possible, briefly (in 3 sentences or less) how the firewall should operate to achieve the desired effect. If you answer False, provide a brief justification for why it isn't possible.

Q2.1 (4 min)

Desired Functionality: Block all inbound TCP connections. Allow all outbound TCP connections.

Firewall: Stateless packet filter

Possible

Not possible

Q2.2 (4 min)

Desired Functionality: Allow all outbound TLS connections. Block all outbound TCP connections that aren't running TLS.

Firewall: Stateful packet filter

Possible

Not possible

Q2.3 (4 min)

Desired Functionality: Allow outbound DNS requests. Block inbound DNS responses. Assume that name servers always listen on port 53.

Firewall: Stateless packet filter

Possible

Not possible

Q2.4 (4 min)

Desired Functionality: Block all HTTP traffic that contains the literal string **Ultron**. Allow all other HTTP traffic.

Firewall: TCP proxy

Possible

Not possible