


**Q1** *I am Inevitable (SP22 Final Q10)*

(20 points)

Recall the WPA 4-way handshake from lecture:



For each method of client-AP authentication, select all things that the given adversary would be able to do. Assume that:

- The attacker does not know the WPA-PSK password but that they know that client's and AP's MAC addresses.
- For rogue AP attacks, there exists a client that knows the password that attempts to connect to the rogue AP attacker.
- The AMAC is the Access Point's MAC address and the SMAC is the Client's MAC address.

Q1.1 (5 points) The client and AP perform the WPA 4-way handshake with the following modifications:

- $PTK = F(\text{ANonce}, \text{SNonce}, \text{AMAC}, \text{SMAC}, \text{PSK})$ , where  $F$  is a secure key derivation function
- $MIC = PTK$
- An on-path attacker that observes a successful handshake can decrypt subsequent WPA messages without learning the value of the PSK.
- An on-path attacker that observes a successful handshake can trick the AP into completing a new handshake without learning the value of the PSK.
- An on-path attacker that observes a successful handshake can learn the PSK without brute force.
- A rogue AP attacker can learn the PSK without brute force.
- A rogue AP attacker can only learn the PSK if they use brute force.
- None of the above

Q1.2 (5 points) The client and AP perform the WPA 4-way handshake with the following modifications:

- $PTK = F(\text{ANonce}, \text{SNonce}, \text{AMAC}, \text{SMAC})$ , where  $F$  is a secure key derivation function
- $MIC = \text{HMAC}(PTK, \text{Dialogue})$
- An on-path attacker that observes a successful handshake can decrypt subsequent WPA messages without learning the value of the PSK.
- An on-path attacker that observes a successful handshake can trick the AP into completing a new handshake without learning the value of the PSK.
- An on-path attacker that observes a successful handshake can learn the PSK without brute force.
- A rogue AP attacker can learn the PSK without brute force.
- A rogue AP attacker can only learn the PSK if they use brute force.
- None of the above

Q1.3 (5 points) The client and AP perform the WPA 4-way handshake with the following modifications:

- Authentication: Client sends  $H(\text{PSK})$  to AP, where  $H$  is a secure cryptographic hash.
  - Verification: AP compares  $H(\text{PSK})$  and to the value it received.
  - AP sends:  $\text{Enc}(\text{PSK}, \text{PTK})$  to client, where  $\text{Enc}$  is an IND-CPA secure encryption algorithm.
- An on-path attacker that observes a successful handshake can decrypt subsequent WPA messages without learning the value of the PSK.
- An on-path attacker that observes a successful handshake can trick the AP into completing a new handshake without learning the value of the PSK.
- An on-path attacker that observes a successful handshake can learn the PSK without brute force.
- A rogue AP attacker can learn the PSK without brute force.
- A rogue AP attacker can only learn the PSK if they use brute force.
- None of the above

Q1.4 (5 points) The client and AP perform the WPA 4-way handshake with the following modifications:

- Authentication: Client conducts a Diffie-Hellman exchange with the AP to derive a shared key  $K$ .
  - Client sends:  $\text{Enc}(K, \text{PSK})$  to the AP.
  - Verification: Check if  $\text{Dec}(K, \text{Ciphertext})$  equals the PSK
  - Upon verification, AP sends:  $\text{Enc}(K, \text{PTK})$ , where PTK is a random value, and sends it to the client.
  - Assume that  $\text{Enc}$  is an IND-CPA secure encryption algorithm.
- An on-path attacker that observes a successful handshake can decrypt subsequent WPA messages without learning the value of the PSK.
- An on-path attacker that observes a successful handshake can trick the AP into completing a new handshake without learning the value of the PSK.
- An on-path attacker that observes a successful handshake can learn the PSK without brute force.
- A rogue AP attacker can learn the PSK without brute force.
- A rogue AP attacker can only learn the PSK if they use offline brute force.
- None of the above

**Q2 Coffee-Shop Attacks (SU21 Final Q4)**

**(17 points)**

Dr. Yang comes to MoonBucks and tries to connect to the network in the coffee shop. Dr. Yang and `http://www.piazza.com` are communicating through TCP. Mallory is an on-path attacker.

Q2.1 (5 points) Which of the following protocols are used when Dr. Yang first connects to the Wi-Fi network and visits `http://www.piazza.com`? Assume any caches are empty. Select all that apply.

- CSRF                       HTTP                       None of the above
- IP                               DHCP

Q2.2 (3 points) Suppose Mallory spoofs a packet with a valid, upcoming sequence number to inject the malicious message into the connection. Would this affect other messages in the connection?

- Yes, because the malicious message replaces some legitimate message
- Yes, because future messages will arrive out of order
- No, because on-path attackers cannot inject packets into a TCP connection
- No, because TCP connections are encrypted

Q2.3 (3 points) To establish a TCP connection, Dr. Yang first sends a SYN packet with  $\text{Seq} = 980$  to the server and receives a SYN-ACK packet with  $\text{Seq} = 603$ ;  $\text{Ack} = 981$ . What packet should Dr. Yang include in the next packet to complete the TCP handshake?

- SYN-ACK packet with  $\text{Seq} = 981$ ;  $\text{Ack} = 604$
- SYN-ACK packet with  $\text{Seq} = 604$ ;  $\text{Ack} = 981$
- ACK packet with  $\text{Seq} = 981$ ;  $\text{Ack} = 604$
- ACK packet with  $\text{Seq} = 604$ ;  $\text{Ack} = 981$
- Nothing to send, because the TCP handshake is already finished.

Q2.4 (3 points) Immediately after the TCP handshake, Mallory injects a valid RST packet to the server. Next, Mallory spoofs a SYN packet from Dr. Yang to the server with headers  $\text{Seq} = X$ . The server responds with a SYN-ACK packet with  $\text{Seq} = Y$ ;  $\text{Ack} = X + 1$ . What is the destination of this packet?

- Dr. Yang                       Mallory
- The server                       None of the above

Q2.5 (3 points) Which of the following network attackers would be able to **reliably** perform the same attacks as Mallory?

- A MITM attacker between Dr. Yang and the server
- An off-path attacker
- All of the above
- None of the above