

Q1 *Cauliflower Smells Really Flavorful*

(17 points)

califlower.com decides to defend against CSRF attacks as follows:

1. When a user logs in, cauliflower.com sets two 32-byte **cookies** `session_id` and `csrf_token` randomly with domain `califlower.com`.
2. When the user sends a POST request, the value of the `csrf_token` is embedded as one of the form fields.
3. On receiving a POST request, cauliflower.com checks that the value of the `csrf_token` cookie matches the one in the form.

Assume that the cookies don't have the `secure`, `HTTPOOnly`, or `Strict` flags set unless stated otherwise. Assume that no CSRF defenses besides the tokens are implemented. Assume every subpart is independent.

Note that CSRF tokens are not usually implemented as cookies, for reasons we will see in this question!

Assume that CSRF tokens can be used multiple times.

Q1.1 (3 points) Suppose the attacker gets the client to visit their malicious website which has domain `evil.com`. What can they do?

- | | |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> (A) CSRF attack against <code>califlower.com</code> | <input type="checkbox"/> (D) None of the above |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (B) Learn the value of the <code>csrf_token</code> cookie | <input type="checkbox"/> (E) — |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (C) Learn the value of the <code>session_id</code> cookie | <input type="checkbox"/> (F) — |

Q1.2 (3 points) Suppose the attacker gets the client to visit their malicious website which has domain `evil.califlower.com`. What can they do?

- | | |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> (G) CSRF attack against <code>califlower.com</code> | <input type="checkbox"/> (J) None of the above |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (H) Learn the value of the <code>csrf_token</code> cookie | <input type="checkbox"/> (K) — |
| <input type="checkbox"/> (I) Learn the value of the <code>session_id</code> cookie | <input type="checkbox"/> (L) — |

Q1.3 (3 points) Suppose the attacker gets the client to visit a page on the website `xss.califlower.com` that contains a stored XSS vulnerability (the website `xss.califlower.com` is not controlled by the attacker). What can they do?

- (A) CSRF attack against `califlower.com`
- (B) Learn the value of the `csrf_token` cookie
- (C) Learn the value of the `session_id` cookie
- (D) None of the above
- (E) —
- (F) —

Q1.4 (3 points) Suppose the attacker is on-path and observes the user make a POST request over HTTP to `califlower.com`. What can they do?

- (G) CSRF attack against `califlower.com`
- (H) Learn the value of the `csrf_token` cookie
- (I) Learn the value of the `session_id` cookie
- (J) None of the above
- (K) —
- (L) —

Q2 Hacking the 161 Staff

(10 points)

After months of development, the CS 161 staff is ready to unveil their new course homepage at `http://cs161.org`. Each TA has their own account and, after authenticating on `http://cs161.org/login`, can update any student's grade on the final exam by making an HTTP GET request to:

```
http://cs161.org/updatefinal?sid=<SID>&score=<SCORE>
```

where `<SID>` is the student ID, and `<SCORE>` is the student's new exam score (as a number – without the percent sign).

Q2.1 Mallory is a student in CS 161, with the student ID of 12345678. She wants to use a CSRF attack to change her exam score to 100 percent. She overhears her TA mention in discussion that he likes to visit `http://cool-web-forum.com` which Mallory happens to know does not properly sanitize HTML in user inputs.

◇ **Question:** Give an input which Mallory can post to the forum in order to execute a CSRF attack to change her exam score, assuming there are no CSRF defenses on `cs161.org`.

Q2.2 The TA then visits the web forum, yet Mallory's grade does not change. Mallory deduces that the 161 staff must have included a defense for CSRF on their webpage. Not one to be deterred, Mallory decides to attempt her attack again.

The login page has an *open redirect*: It can be provided a webpage to automatically redirect to after the user successfully authenticates. For example the URL:

```
http://cs161.org/login?to=http://google.com
```

would redirect any logged in user to `http://google.com`.

Using this information, Mallory crafts the following attack—replacing your URL in part (a) with the following URL:

```
http://cs161.org/login?to=http://cs161.org/updatefinal?sid=12345678&score=100
```

A few minutes later, Mallory observes that her final grade is changed to a 100 percent. Which of the following are CSRF defenses that Mallory might have circumvented?

- | | | |
|---|--|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Origin checking | <input type="checkbox"/> Content-Security-Policy | <input type="checkbox"/> Cookie policy |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Referer checking | <input type="checkbox"/> Prepared statements | <input type="checkbox"/> Same-origin policy |
| <input type="checkbox"/> CSRF tokens | <input type="checkbox"/> Session cookies | <input type="checkbox"/> None of the above |

Q2.3 The 161 staff update their site to better protect against CSRF. Mallory now notices that the website contains a profile page for each member of the 161 staff, reachable from the URL

`http://cs161.org/staff?name=<name>`

where `<name>` is replaced with each staff member's name. If the provided `<name>` does not correspond to a member of the 161 staff, then instead a page is loaded with a message stating "Sorry, but there is no TA named `<name>`!"

Suspecting that this website might be vulnerable to reflected XSS, Mallory visits the following URL:

`http://cs161.org/staff?name=<script>alert(0);</script>`

A Javascript popup immediately appears on her screen. Mallory smiles, realizing that she can weaponize this to login as her TA. She returns to the web forum that her TA frequently visits and posts a link.

Assume that Mallory's TA will click on any link that he sees on the web forum, and assume that Mallory controls her own website `http://mallory.com`.

◇ **Question:** How can Mallory pull off her attack and login as her TA? Make sure to include the link she posts on the forum in your answer. If you assume that Mallory's website has any scripts running, you must define what they are and what inputs they take in.

Given your performance as a skilled attacker of the UnicornBox website, university administrators have asked you to assess the security of the CalCentral platform.

The CalCentral website is set up as follows:

Q3 CalCentral Security (20 points)

CalCentral is located at `https://calcentral.berkeley.edu/`.

- The Central Authentication Service (CAS) is located at `https://auth.berkeley.edu/`.
- CalCentral uses session tokens stored in cookies for authentication, similar to Project 3. The session token cookie has domain `berkeley.edu`, and the `Secure` and `HttpOnly` flags are set.
- CalCentral does **not** use CSRF tokens or any form of CSRF protection.

Each subpart is independent.

Q3.1 (3 points) When a user attempts to sign in on CalCentral, the CAS login portal appears in a pop-up window.

TRUE OR FALSE: Because CalCentral and CAS have the same origin, CAS can update the CalCentral webpage when a user signs in successfully.

- (A) True, because CalCentral and CAS are managed by the same organization.
- (B) True, because windows with the same origin can interact with each other.
- (C) False, because pop-up windows can never affect other windows, regardless of the origin.
- (D) False, because CalCentral and CAS don't have the same origin.
- (E) —
- (F) —

Q3.2 (3 points) When a user attempts to sign in on CalCentral, the CAS login portal appears in an `i` frame embedded on the CalCentral page.

TRUE OR FALSE: This design allows CalCentral to modify the text field on the CAS website to autofill the username field.

- (G) True, because CalCentral and CAS are managed by the same organization.
- (H) True, because the inner frame is loaded with the same origin of the outer frame.
- (I) False, because Javascript is needed to autofill form fields.
- (J) False, because the outer frame cannot affect the contents of the inner frame.
- (K) —
- (L) —

Q3.3 (3 points) If a user is logged into CalCentral (has a valid session token cookie), a GET Request to `https://calcentral.berkeley.edu/api/photo/` will contain a response with their CalCentral photo. The website `https://evil.com/` loads an image with the following HTML snippet:

```
<image src="https://calcentral.berkeley.edu/api/photo/">
```

TRUE OR FALSE: If a user is currently signed into CalCentral, the `https://evil.com/` website will be able to successfully display their photo.

- (A) True, because the browser attaches the session token in the request to CalCentral.
- (B) True, because the referer in the request is `https://calcentral.berkeley.edu`.
- (C) False, because the browser does not attach the session token in the request to CalCentral.
- (D) False, because the referer in the request is `https://evil.com`.
- (E) —
- (F) —

Q3.4 (3 points) You find a reflected XSS vulnerability on CAS. `https://berkeley.edu` has a footnote that says “UC Berkeley.”

TRUE OR FALSE: Using this vulnerability, you can cause the victim to see “CS 161 Enterprises” in the footnote when they visit `https://berkeley.edu`.

- (G) True, because the script runs with the same origin as `https://berkeley.edu`.
- (H) True, because XSS subverts the same-origin policy.
- (I) False, because the script runs with a different origin from `https://berkeley.edu`.
- (J) False, because the script only affects the browser’s local copy of the site.
- (K) —
- (L) —

Q3.5 (3 points) You find a stored XSS vulnerability on CalCentral.

TRUE OR FALSE: Using this vulnerability, you can cause the victim to load CalCentral with the “My Academics” button changed to link to `https://evil.com/`.

- (A) True, because Javascript on a page can change that page’s HTML
- (B) True, because CalCentral does not implement CSRF tokens.
- (C) False, because Javascript on a page cannot change that page’s HTML
- (D) False, because `https://evil.com` has a different origin from CalCentral
- (E) —
- (F) —